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Abstract
Pervasive computing envisions an environment in
which we are surrounded by many embedded computer
devices. Those networked devices provide us with a
mobile, spontaneous and dynamic way to access var-
ious resources provided by domains with diﬀerent secu-
rity policies. The conventional approach to secure ac-
cess over multiple domains is to implement a univer-
sal trusted infrastructure, extending local identity- or
capability-based security systems and combining them
with cross-domain authentication mechanisms. How-
ever, this does not adequately meet the security re-
quirements of communicating with strangers in perva-
sive environments. This paper presents an intrinsically
multi-domain oriented approach which incorporates an
identity-based encryption (IBE) access control mecha-
nism. This approach allows the right domain to get
involved with its local players’ interactions by helping
them to convert a token to a usable access capability,
whilst facilitating revocation.
Keywords: Domain-oriented access control, pervasive
computing, identity-based encryption, revocation.
1. Introduction
Today’s spontaneous and highly decentralised per-
vasive computing environment [24, 25, 29] has raised
a number of new challenges in a considerably under-
explored territory, security over multiple domains. By
the term domain, we denote the scope of security policy
rather than geographic location. Traditionally, security
in the multiple domain context has not been holistically
researched. A major argument is that a successful pro-
tocol targeting one domain can “easily” be lifted to
multiple domains. This is mainly fulﬁlled by requiring
assistance from a globally trusted infrastructure.
However, in pervasive environments, resources (ei-
ther hardware, e.g. a DVD player, a fax machine, a
wireless camera, or software programs running on vari-
ous devices) are usually provided by a variety of diﬀer-
ent suppliers, for instance, organisations, companies,
universities, shops, even other human users, and so on.
Thus, there is typically a lack of a global infrastruc-
ture which every player will trust. Moreover, we do
not desire to force each domain to implement the same
(or even compatible) security infrastructure and mech-
anisms.
Consequently, we have proposed an architectural
framework, Localisation of Trust (LoT) [21], to de-
ploy domains as a primary setting of pervasive envi-
ronments 1. We argue that security for the pervasive
environment can be solved better, if security for multi-
ple domains is solved ﬁrst. This paper provides a con-
ceptual discussion of our approach for access control in
multiple domains. We also give an existence proof, in
the form of a Kerberos-like protocol based on Identity-
based Encryption (IBE), which supports the approach
we advocate. Further protocols and mechanisms are
discussed in the research report [21].
This paper starts with a brief review of previous ap-
proaches. In section 3, we highlight the security need
of talking to the right strangers in pervasive environ-
ments, and introduce the notion of localising the trust,
followed by a description of our domain-oriented ap-
proach in section 4. An architecture for Encryption-
Based Access Control (EBAC) and the important revo-
cation issue will be explained in section 5 and 6 respec-
1The term pervasive environments in this paper includes (but
is not limited to) any pervasive computing applications that gen-
uinely involve many diﬀerent domains.
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tively. We then illustrate a simple pervasive computing
example using domain-based approach in section 7. Fi-
nally, conclusions are set out in section 8.
2. Previous Approaches
Eﬀorts to secure pervasive computing and funda-
mental communication structure (mobile ad-hoc net-
works) have received increasing attention in the secu-
rity research ﬁeld. In their novel “Resurrecting Duck-
ling” security model [26, 27], Stajano and Anderson
mark a physical contact idea to bootstrap trust be-
tween strangers. Moreover, based upon this approach,
Balfanz et al. [4] introduce a pre-authentication pro-
cess to exchange some relevant cryptographic material
in a demonstrative identiﬁcation (physical recognition),
authentic and secure location-limited channel (such as
infrared, ultrasound or a short-wire).
Kagal et al. [18, 19] target the security challenges
which have arisen from lack of central control and
rarely predetermined users in the pervasive comput-
ing environment. Their systems are built from XML
language to form distributed trust (following Blaze’s
PolicyMaker [5]) rather than just user authentication
and access control. To access a resource, a foreign user
Bob requests permission from a local user Alice. Alice
hands over to Bob a signed delegation certiﬁcate that
implies the proper access rights are delegated to Bob.
Then, Bob’s request will be granted after he sends the
security manager this delegation certiﬁcate along with
his identity certiﬁcate. The trust-based systems will
make the ﬁnal decision based upon the policy check,
e.g. whether Alice’s rights are revoked.
Among classic capability-based access control sys-
tem, Gong’s I-CAP [15] is designed keeping multiple
domains in mind. Potentially, the domain in an I-
CAP system is not geography-based. It introduces
two forms of capabilities, external and internal capa-
bilities. The resource server generates a random num-
ber R0 for a resource Object. The internal capabil-
ity (Object,R0) is only known by the server. Then,
the servers computes R1, which is the hashed value
of the group (IDuser ,Object,AccessControl,R0) for a
local user in the system. The external bit-pattern
(IDuser,Object,AccessControl,R1) is delegated to the
corresponding user. As a result, diﬀerent users hold
diﬀerent bit-pattern which corresponds to capabilities
for the same object. Unfortunately, the I-CAP system
requires a good underlying (cross-domain) authentica-
tion mechanism to address the freshness problem.
3. Paradigm Shift in Security
If a pervasive computing environment only replaces
wires with wireless RF media, then to secure such an
environment is not too hard, considering the well de-
veloped cryptosystems. However, the new challenges
[9, 11, 27], for instance, poorly deﬁned network bound-
aries, dynamic enrollment, no pre-conﬁguration, tran-
sient association and decentralised infrastructure, have
entailed a massive qualitative change in security re-
quirements.
3.1. Talking to the Right Strangers
An interesting threat emerging from pervasive com-
puting environments is, talking to incorrect strangers,
who are usually from diﬀerent domains and not likely
to pre-establish secure knowledge (e.g. crypto-key in-
formation) or trust relationships. An old paradigm to
address this problem is to create a trusted environ-
ment by employing a global unique trusted infrastruc-
ture, such as Kerberos [28], PKI, etc. They are intro-
duced to help players to determine correct strangers
usually by verifying their IDs, names, long-term public
keys, or roles. Thus, a security system or protocol im-
plemented successfully in one domain can be migrated
to diﬀerent domains involved in the communications,
combining with both important and necessary cross-
domain authentication mechanisms.
In pervasive environments, however, we have no
prior knowledge about the names/IDs, or roles of those
to whom we are going to talk, or which kind of privilege
a user needs to access resources. It is not only infea-
sible to create a trusted environment to which those
players can connect: more importantly, the need to
have global trust is actually distracting us from what
is more important in our own domains. The trusted
infrastructure has its required assumptions. Thus, in-
evitably, players have to set up their own assumptions
and security policies in accordance with those of the
infrastructure. However, the semantics of the threat
model will be diﬀerent due to the nature of pervasive
environments. Threats are speciﬁc to the requirements
from diﬀerent pervasive applications and assumptions
which will not be known to the infrastructure. Secu-
rity thus becomes a harder problem as soon as a user is
required to trust an arbitrary external authority. Con-
sequently, we should not let infrastructure dictate local
policy, and we should avoid building anything on top
of cross-domain authentication.
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3.2. Localising the Trust Security Principle
When an interaction crosses domain boundaries, it
is not only hard but (we shall argue) also unnecessary
for a player from one domain to understand the precise
security policy and mechanisms from other domains.
Thus, we need a diﬀerent 2 security design principle
to guide security policy establishing trust for pervasive
environments. The main security design guideline in
security policy in LoT is the localising the trust princi-
ple. This allows a pervasive player to put trusted things
in her own domain, or some places that the player al-
ready has stable connection with. Explicitly, domains
are responsible to make the security decisions for their
local players with respect to local policies.
In fact, the localising the trust principle ties a
player’s claim closely with her aﬃliated local domain,
encouraging domains to get involved with their lo-
cal players’ interactions. Hence, we need to have a
form of information showing which domain the player
is from3, like an email address. An email address
clearly indicates the association between a domain and
a player, for instance, LJ@herts.ac.uk, which contains
the knowledge that “the user LJ is coming from do-
main herts.ac.uk”. It is another issue to verify the
authenticity of the domain, “is there really a domain
named herts.ac.uk (and is it the university or not)”
or the relationship, “is LJ really AT herts.ac.uk”.
Whether such an association between users and do-
mains actually exists is controlled by the domain-
oriented approach described in the next section.
4. Domain-Oriented Approach
In our work, the concept of achieving access control
in the multiple domain context is syntactically simi-
lar to the one witnessed in conventional environments.
Semantically, however, the domain-oriented approach
for access control in pervasive environments diﬀers by
allowing domains to authenticate their local players.
Hence, the diﬃcult problem (access control over mul-
tiple domains) is reduced to two considerably easier
problems (user authentication in a single local domain
and remote authorisation between two domains) that
we are more conﬁdent to deal with.
This is more eﬃcient than implementing authenti-
cation across domains. As illustrated in ﬁgure 1, it
2Diﬀerent in the sense of changing the way of thinking on cur-
rent security policies. The policies themselves may be perfectly
adequate in some cases.
3For readers who are interested in this, the LoT framework
[21] actually introduced a novel Proﬁle Certiﬁcates to make this
association.
is Bob’s job to convince domain B that he is entitled
to access this particular resource. Alice has delegated
some rights over her resources to players from domain
B. Alice does not care how Bob authenticates himself
to his own domain. She is happy to grant Bob’s access
once the conversion is completed successfully.
O w n e r  o f  S e r v i c e
      
 A l i c e
S e r v i c e
S
B o b
D o m a i n  B ’ s
S e r v e r
R e s o u r c e s  S e r v e r  D o m a i n U s e r  D o m a i n
2 .  a c c e s s  r e q u e s t
3 .  a c c e s s  t o k e n
4 .  a c c e s s  c a p a b i l i t y
1 .  a c c e s s  c r e d e n t i a l
Figure 1: Alice delegates a domain-based access
credential (ACB) to a user domain B (i.e. its
domain server). When a player Bob from do-
main B requests to access a particular resource
owned by Alice, she will give Bob an access “to-
ken” based upon Bob’s access request. This “to-
ken” can only be converted to a usable access ca-
pability help from the correct domain B.
4.1. Remote Authorisation - Delegation of
Rights
Delegation is a natural consideration for making
access control decisions [1]. Thus, in the domain-
oriented approach, the resource domain intends to del-
egate some access rights (on a particular resource) to
other users’ domains, very often with some restrictions.
Usually, Alice generates some form of access creden-
tials, depending upon the delegation mechanisms de-
ployed within her own domain, and hands over them
to domain B.
Those access credentials are required to be:
• Domain dependent: credentials should be do-
main relative. It is important that diﬀerent user
domains should have diﬀerent bit patterns of ac-
cess credentials for the same access right on the
same resource. In this way, the compromise of
one user domain does not help an attacker to gain
any information of usable forms of access creden-
tials for other user domains. Moreover, the delega-
tion mechanism deployed in the resource domain
needs to ensure that the collusion of some misbe-
having user domains still cannot assist the attacker
in terms of constructing a usable access credential.
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• Presentation restriction: in contrast with most
delegated access control systems (where possession
of a delegated access credential is both necessary
and suﬃcient to gain access, e.g. a secure capa-
bility), the (direct) presentation of the domain-
relative credentials is neither necessary nor suf-
ﬁcient for a player to access a certain resource.
Actually, post-issue presentation is extremely re-
stricted. Alice will not grant access to Bob if he
naively submits domain B’s access credential. In-
stead, Alice will regard domain B as compromised
and revoke domain B’s access right, because do-
main B must explicitly delegate the credential to
Bob.
An example of this type of access credentials is dual
capabilities described in the LoT framework [21]. It
heavily borrows Gong’s novel idea of having internal
and external capabilities. However, the basic system
infrastructure is built from the domain-oriented ap-
proach for access control. Instead of requiring an addi-
tional cross-domain authentication mechanism to check
the user’s ID at the time of using the external capabil-
ity, authentication occurs only locally within the user’s
own domain. As a consequence, our access credentials
are not simply access control tokens. In fact, their
primary function is to let (remote) users authenticate
themselves to their own, and more importantly correct,
domain.
4.2. Localised Authentication
In our domain-oriented approach, the authentica-
tion step only occurs locally (within the user’s own
domain). Hence, from Alice’s perspective, it is Bob’s
problem to authenticate himself/herself to the correct
domain B. This can be realised by many existing mech-
anisms, e.g. classic Kerberos-like protocols [12, 28],
policy-based trust management [5], or more pervasive
security protocols [4, 11, 27], etc. We do not discuss
those mechanisms in this paper. Instead, we encourage
domains to choose a proper authentication mechanism
freely and be responsible for their choice, in accordance
with their own domain policies.
The basic idea of localised authentication has been
hinted in the Identity-based Encryption cryptosystem
(IBE). The IBE system does not require a chained
or transitive trust relationship along the transmission
path. Instead, trust is only established between end-
users and a local trusted party, e.g. Private Key Gen-
erator (PKG) in the user’s local domain. But to our
knowledge, the use of IBE for access control has not
previously been signiﬁcantly explored. We desire a
mechanism connecting remote authorisation and lo-
calised authentication steps in the domain-oriented ap-
proach for access control over multiple domains. This
can be realised by an encryption-based access control
mechanism.
5. The Architecture of Encryption-based
Access Control (EBAC)
From the perspective of encryption, the encryption-
based access control sketched here is analogous to
some existing Identity-based encryption (IBE) schemes
[2, 6, 13, 17]. For instance, it lets Alice encrypt a mes-
sage in a way that Bob can only decrypt with the nec-
essary assistance from some security services in his own
domain (domain B). In EBAC, this message will be an
access capability for a resource in Alice’s domain.
From our perspective, pairing-based IBE is not suit-
able for the multiple domain context. In those systems,
every domain’s public key has to be available, at least
at the time when a user requests access. If the authen-
ticity of the domain’s public key is certiﬁed by some
external certiﬁcates authorities, the certiﬁcate revoca-
tion and trust transitivity problems re-emerge.
The basic construction for encryption-based access
control proposed in this paper is converted from Gol-
dreich et al.’s self-delegation scheme [14]. In their orig-
inal system, the purpose is to delegate certain rights
from a user to a user himself without risking the com-
promise of her long-term private/public key pair (pri-
mary public/private key). Accordingly, secondary key
pairs (sk, pk) are created by the user. They can only
be validated with a validation tag (val) based upon
a certain limitation (the limitation index ). Given a
triple (sk, val, pk), the player is able to convince a
veriﬁer that a certain public key pk can be used on
behalf of the primary key (given the limitation index ,
a primary public key and the necessary system set up
parameters).
We take advantage of the fact that a pri-
vate/public key pair can also be applied to do decryp-
tion/encryption operations. Assume that PK∗ is the
full encryption key and SK∗ is the full decryption key.
An overview for the EBAC scheme described above
is illustrated in ﬁgure 2. Alice generates a master secret
SK ﬁrstly in her own domain and computes a pair
(SK,PK) for a user domain B. This pair is called
the access rights pair, where PK is ACB . From the
requirements of being domain-dependent, we know,
• Given a set of values from a set of PK, it is still
(computationally) infeasible to compute any SK
or the master secret value SK.
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Figure 2: to access Alice’s resources, a stranger
Bob has to retrieve a partial decryption key
(PDK) from his own domain B.
The construction of the access rights pair will be highly
dependent on the mechanism that Alice chooses to use
to delegate access rights, e.g. a secure capability, a
public key pair, and so forth.
Encryption/Decryption: now, we will have,
• The Partial Decryption Key (PDK) which can be
provided by domain B and is based upon the access
credential (ACB) delegated from Alice to domain
B during the remote authorisation step. Given
any collections of issued PDKs from a set of local
players in domain B, an attacker cannot compute
the value of ACB.
PDK = ACB ∪ SK = PK ∪ SK, (1)
SK is added to ACB to generate a PDK. SK
is the secret part of the key pair (SK, PK) gen-
erated by domain B after inputting the access in-
dex . The use of SK is to guarantee that the
ACB will be kept secret to domain B (the user’s
domain). The key pair (SK, PK) is called the
Endorsement Pair in EBAC.
• A full encryption/decryption key pair,
Encryption key: PK∗ = SK ∪ PKr ∪ PK, (2)
Decryption key: SK∗ = PDK ∪ SKr =
PK ∪ SK ∪ SKr, (3)
Based upon the idea of delegation of responsibility
[10], EBAC lets Bob generate a key pair (SKr,
PKr) and commit the secret component SKr.
This plays two important roles here. First of all,
the existence of SKr prevents a misbehaving do-
main B to masquerade as Bob. Secondly and more
importantly, if Bob decides to collude with another
local player Moriarty from the very beginning, Bob
has to give SKr to Moriarty. This will force Bob
to compromise his personal secret to an attacker,
in order to breach security. We can consider for
example that this (SKr, PKr) pair is associated
with some form of digital cash [3, 7, 23] for Bob.
Thus, Bob is not willing to give up SKr by any
means. The key pair (SKr, PKr) is called a Re-
sponsibility Pair in EBAC.
• Two algorithms, Encrypt{} and Decrypt{}.
1. Encrypt{}: this algorithm is used to encrypt
a message M under the encryption key, PK∗,
after inputting SK, PKr, PK.
2. Decrypt{}: correspondingly, it is called by
Bob to recover the message M by taking
the full decryption key, SK∗, after inputting
PDK and SKr.
Note that “∪’ here is only a symbol. The mathe-
matical meaning varies depending on the underlying
cryptographic algorithm chosen in the implementation
(again, more practical approaches based upon discrete-
logarithm can be found in our work [21]).
Generally speaking, revocation works closely with
access control, the delegation semantics in particular.
We cannot discuss delegation without having revoca-
tion in mind.
6. Revocation
Revocation is one of the main diﬃculties for many
security systems. A notorious case is the (public key)
certiﬁcate revocation problem that has been witnessed
in many PKI-based systems. Conventionally, the re-
vocation problem has been dealt with separately and
some ad-hoc mechanisms have been provided for man-
aging revocation information [16]. However, it is diﬃ-
cult to believe that players will understand and check
these detached revocation mechanisms at all. Also, it
is problematic to support the timeliness of revocation
information. Particularly, since pervasive communica-
tions usually involve multiple domains, a domain may
not always be aware of security policy changes in other
domains. In addition, the extra cost to manage revo-
cation will be signiﬁcant because most pervasive appli-
cations may take place on a purely temporary basis.
The domain-oriented EBAC brings a number of sig-
niﬁcant impacts (i.e. immediateness, selectiveness and
revocation transitivity) by integrating revocation as
part of a normal transaction. If domain B wants to
revoke a local user Bob’s access rights on accessing
shared resources owned by Alice (which may be long-
term, e.g., Bob is not an employee any more, or may
be temporary invalidation, e.g. Bob takes one day’s
leave), domain B needs only to stop issuing the PDK,
when Bob requests the necessary crypto key materials
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in real-time interactions. As shown in ﬁgure 2, Bob
cannot generate a full decryption key without acquir-
ing a current PDK from domain B. Moreover, Bob is
not able to compute the correct PDK on his own. Con-
sequently, the PDK can be considered as the revocation
factor created by domain B. Once B drops its pointer
to the PDK, the access request from Bob immediately
stops forwarding. All the access statements Bob has
become useless.
Alternatively, Alice may not want any players from
domain B to access a certain resource any more, for in-
stance, the contract expires. She just needs to revoke
the proper access rights for domain B. Since revoking
access rights takes place within her own domain, Alice
can maintain a domain-based access control list locally
for instance 4. If she wants to revoke a domain’s ac-
cess rights, she deletes this domain’s access credentials
from the domain access control list. To compose a local
player’s access credential, the domain’s one has to be
included. As a result, if a request contains a revoked
domain’s information, Alice will abort the communica-
tion.
7. A Pervasive Computing Scenario
Consider a simple but interesting (in the security
protocol sense) pervasive application, the public meet-
ing. Alice is the marketing manager of company A,
and she meets company B’s marketing manager Bob
for the ﬁrst time in a public conference room. Alice
would like to securely transfer a private project plan
m from her personal device (DRDalice) to Bob’s hand-
held device (DRDbob). Assume Alice does not know
Bob in person, so in other words, Bob is a stranger to
Alice although company B is known to Alice. Thus,
Alice has to be convinced that she is talking to the
right Bob (in addition to talking to the right device).
In most conventional approaches, for instance, Ker-
beros, Bob has to get a ticket from company B’s server
before this meeting. Then, he submits this ticket to Al-
ice during the meeting. If Alice recognises Bob’s ticket,
she checks the access rights associated with the ticket
to determine if Bob has the correct rights (compared
with his access request) to access the document m. If
so, Alice grants Bob’s access request. Otherwise, Bob’s
access will be refused.
For our domain-oriented approach, brieﬂy speaking,
Bob needs to submit his access credential, but this is
not used for Alice to make a ﬁnal access decision. In-
stead, it contains just suﬃcient information to tell Alice
4Having a local access control list is not a step backward. Like
Karger’s S-CAP [20], an access control list is adequate here as
long as it can be kept local to Alice’s own domain.
which domain Bob is from. Alice checks whether com-
pany B already has permission to access the document
m. If so, Alice gives Bob an encrypted access token
which can be converted to a useful access capability
only by the correct domain, i.e. company B. This con-
version can be completed by the credentials (e.g. dual
capabilities) established during the remote authorisa-
tion stage between two companies. Most importantly,
Bob can only decrypt this token by authenticating him-
self to his own company in accordance with his own
company’s policy. If company B is willing to delegate
Bob access to m, company B’s server will help Bob to
decrypt the token. If company B does not want Bob
to access the plan m, Bob cannot decrypt the token.
Thus, Bob’s access is granted only if the token issued
by Alice is converted by Bob’s domain to a useful ac-
cess capability. As well as being authenticated by his
own domain, Bob must also prove to Alice that he is
in control of the hardware to which Alice has given the
token 5.
This scenario demonstrates the eﬀectiveness and ef-
ﬁciency of deploying a domain-based approach to ad-
dress the access control issue in pervasive environ-
ments. Essentially, Alice does not care who Bob is
as long as Bob’s domain, i.e. company B, has the cor-
rect access credentials and Bob has his own domain’s
permission to use them.
8. Conclusions
A powerful tool to address access control in perva-
sive environments is to understand pervasive comput-
ing environments from a multi-domain perspective. In
this approach, the ﬁnal commit/abort security deci-
sions are ultimately managed by local domains rather
than external authorities. This is an eﬃcient approach
because a player does not need to understand the
semantics of security mechanisms in other domains.
Moreover, by treating revocation as part of the nor-
mal transaction, the EBAC scheme eﬀectively solves
the revocation bottleneck inherent in most delegation-
focused access control systems.
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